Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially regulated blame perspective. According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for regulating other's behavior. Because it is costly for both blamers and violators, blame is typically constrained by requirements for "warrant"-evidence that one's moral judgment is justified. This requirement motivates people to systematically process available causal and mental information surrounding a violation. That is, people are relatively calibrated and evenhanded in utilizing evidence that either amplifies or mitigates blame. Such systematic processing should be particularly visible when people update their moral judgments. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we test 2 sets of predictions derived from the socially regulated blame perspective and compare them with predictions from a motivated-blame perspective. Studies 1-4 demonstrate (across student, Internet, and community samples) that moral perceivers systematically grade updated blame judgments in response to the strength of new causal and mental information, without anchoring on initial evaluations. Further, these studies reveal that perceivers update blame judgments symmetrically in response to exacerbating and mitigating information, inconsistent with motivated-blame predictions. Study 5 shows that graded and symmetric blame updating is robust under cognitive load. Lastly, Study 6 demonstrates that biases can emerge once the social requirement for warrant is relaxed-as in the case of judging outgroup members. We conclude that social constraints on blame judgments render the normal process of blame well calibrated to causal and mental information, and biases may appear when such constraints are absent.
lated, motivating people to be systematic in their information processing toward blame.
The psychological literature, however, often paints a less optimistic view of moral cognition. A family of theories, which we collectively refer to as motivated-blame models, suggest that consideration of causal and mental information is secondary to and biased by early emerging moral judgments and a general desire to blame.
1 On this view moral judgments quickly emerge in response to a norm violation, and people consider the details of the event (e.g., intentionality, reasons, and controllability) later, often as a post hoc rationalization of their judgments (Alicke, 2000; Haidt, 2001; Knobe, 2003; Pettit & Knobe, 2009; Tetlock et al., 2007) . For example, Greene (2008) describes humans as "creatures who exhibit social and moral behavior that is driven largely by intuitive emotional responses and who are prone to rationalization of their behaviors" (pp. 62-63) .
Comparing the socially regulated and motivated-blame perspectives has proved difficult (see Guglielmo, 2015) . The two perspectives, while not mutually exclusive, do however make divergent predictions about how people update moral judgments. Updating refers to making a moral judgment and then learning new information (mitigating or exacerbating) that invites a revision of the initial judgment. For such moral updating situations, the socially regulated blame perspective suggests that demands for warrant motivate perceivers to engage in relatively systematic processing of available causal and mental information, including evenhandedly weighing mitigating and exacerbating information. By contrast, motivated-blame models suggest that a desire to blame motivates people to engage in biased judgment revisions, asymmetrically favoring information that confirms or exacerbates existing blame judgment over information that mitigates blame (Alicke, 2000; Ames & Fiske, 2013) .
In the present studies we introduce a new experimental paradigm that models a moral updating situation. The process of updating person representations is well documented in the impression formation literature (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Kammrath, Ames, & Scholer, 2007; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013; Rapp & Kendeou, 2007; Reeder & Brewer, 1979) , but it has not been explored in the moral domain. In our paradigm (Monroe & Malle, 2017) , people (a) encounter a sparse description of an immoral event, (b) make an initial blame judgment of that event, (c) receive additional information about the perpetrator's mental states or causal contributions (that could mitigate or exacerbate blame), and (d) have the opportunity to register an updated blame judgment. This paradigm allows us to test finegrained predictions about graded judgment updates that are systematically responsive to different types of informationpredictions that fall out of the recently proposed Path Model of Blame (Malle et al., 2014) . Additionally, changes from initial to updated blame judgments allow us to compare the Path Model's prediction of symmetric updating (perceivers are equally responsive to mitigating as to exacerbating information) with motivated-blame models' prediction of asymmetric updating (perceivers are more responsive to exacerbating than to mitigating information). Below we review the socially regulated blame and motivated-blame perspectives in more detail and develop their predictions for moral updating.
Theoretical Background The Socially Regulated Blame Perspective
Theorists broadly agree that morality evolved to facilitate group life (Carnes, Lickel, & Janoff-Bulman, 2015; Haidt, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011) . Indeed blame-as socially expressed disapproval-may be one of the oldest tools for human behavior regulation (Przepiorka & Berger, 2016; Voiklis & Malle, 2017) and is effective at enforcing cooperation (Guala, 2012 ). Yet, to accomplish its social-regulatory function blame must be publicly expressed, either to moral offenders or to others as gossip, and as such it imposes costs on the alleged offender (e.g., loss of face, status, or reputation) and also comes with risks for the blamer if the accusation is unfounded or the offender retaliates.
Indeed, the social context in which blame emerged highlights the potential costs of unfounded blame. In the 40 -80,000 years before human settlements, humans lived in small nomadic bands where cooperation and maintaining relationships was critical to survival (Boehm, 2000; Knauft et al., 1991) . In these bands, norm violations and people's responses to them were inherently transparent affairs (Silberbauer, 1982; Wilson, 1991) . Thus, to keep these costs in check, and to maintain fair treatment (Wallace, 1994) , acts of blaming became regulated by social norms of moral criticism (Coates & Tognazzini, 2012; Malle et al., 2014) . 2 In this line, recent research demonstrates that people are strongly averse to overblaming (Kim, Voiklis, Cusimano, & Malle, 2015) and to unwarranted blame (Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998) . People react negatively when they feel unfairly blamed (MacCoun, 2005; Miller, 2001) , and even preschool children are willing to correct an adult who unfairly punishes another agent for an accidental transgression (Chernyak & Sobel, 2016) . Conversely, failures to blame and punish carry similar risks. For example, in June 2018, Aaron Persky-the judge who presided over the infamous Brock Turner sexual assault case-was recalled, largely because of public outrage over the perception that he failed to sufficiently punish Turner. Likewise, recent empirical work demonstrates that people who decide to forgive wrongdoers rather than punishing them are perceived as blameworthy and as having bad moral character (Gardner & Monroe, 2018) .
Thus, moral judges must walk a fine line: overblaming risks reactive aggression from targets; whereas, underblaming risks being censured in turn. Appreciating the social context in which acts of blame occur suggests that moral perceivers are motivated to "get blame right" or, at a minimum to make judgments broadly perceived as fair. However, what does "getting blame right" mean?
It means grounding one's judgment in just the kind of evidence that community members routinely use in forming and checking blame judgments: information about the severity of harm, causality, intentionality, and mental states (Cushman, 2008; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Malle, 1999; Malle et al., 2014; Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Young & Saxe, 2009 ).
This theoretical perspective suggests that people will flexibly revise blame judgments in response to new, morally relevant information (e.g., intentionality, reasons, or outcome preventability), regardless of whether the information supports increasing or decreasing blame. On the face of it, these prediction appear to contradict well-documented findings on general information processing biases, especially the confirmation bias (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Gilovich, 1983) . However, recent research on nonmoral person perception hints at conditions under which people readily update their representations of others' character , namely when they identify new information that is diagnostic and meaningful as opposed to merely inconsistent with a previous impression (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Cone, Mann, & Ferguson, 2017; Mende-Siedlecki, Baron, & Todorov, 2013) . Furthermore, because social demands put a premium on diagnostic information about norm violators, confirmation bias may well play a more limited role in interpersonal moral judgments of blame.
Indeed, this prediction is supported by research on accountability. When people are publicly accountable for their judgments they are more likely to overcome common cognitive biases (Tetlock, 1985) , engage in flexible and systematic information processing (Scholten, van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2007; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) , and make more nuanced judgments about moral responsibility (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998) . However, the socially regulated blame perspective goes one step further in suggesting that blame judgments will be nuanced and systematic not only under explicit accountability demands but whenever blame judgments are publicly expressed, including in the context of an experiment. As a result, blame should be generally less susceptible to confirmation bias than are other moral and nonmoral judgments. However, arguing that blame is socially regulated does not imply that people are perfectly systematic or calibrated in their judgments. Rather, the potential social costs of over-or underblaming prompt people to attend to available information and to strive to adjust their initial judgment in light of it.
The Motivated-Blame Perspective
Virtually all perspectives on moral judgment agree that people respond to norm-violating events with rapid evaluation (Luo et al., 2006; Van Berkum, Holleman, Nieuwland, Otten, & Murre, 2009 ) that activates further information processing (Mikhail, 2007) . According to the motivated-blame perspective, more specifically, early emerging moral evaluations and a desire to blame bias subsequent information processing of causal and mental-state information in favor of confirming or strengthening blame (Alicke, 1992; Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009; Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004; Nadelhoffer, 2006; Nadler, 2012) . For example, Alicke and colleagues argue that, "Negative evaluations or spontaneous reactions lead to the hypothesis that the source of the evaluations is blameworthy, and to an active desire to blame that source. This desire, in turn, leads observers to interpret the available evidence in a way that supports their blame hypothesis" (Alicke, Rose, & Bloom, 2011, p. 675) . Similarly, Ditto and colleagues propose that "Moral judgments are most typically top-down affairs, with the individual generating moral arguments with intuitions about the 'correct' moral conclusion already firmly in place" (Ditto et al., 2009, pp. 313-314) . A common metaphor for motivated-blame theories is that people act like prosecutors whose ultimate goal is to mete out punishment rather than to discover the truth (Tetlock et al., 2007) .
Evidence in support of the motivated-blame perspective suggests that, in the presence of initial negative moral evaluation, people are inclined to judge violations as intentional (e.g., Knobe, 2003) , to inflate perceptions of harm (Ames & Fiske, 2013) , to see perpetrators as more strongly causally involved (Alicke, 1992) , and to exaggerate judgments of foreseeability (Mazzocco et al., 2004) . This bias of seeing more intentionality, causality, harm, or foreseeability amounts to a tendency to embrace information that exacerbates blame and to discount information that mitigates blame. More explicitly, Alicke et al. (2011) write: ". . . the culpable-control model assumes that the control elements (behavior, causal, and outcome) that observers analyze are processed in a 'blame validation' mode. Blame validation entails either exaggerating a person's actual or potential control over an event to justify the desired blame judgment or altering the threshold for how much control is required for blame" (p. 675).
Thus, the motivated-blame perspective predicts that the change of blame from the earliest possible judgment to the final assessment (after additional information has been processed), should be asymmetrically biased-favoring small reductions of blame in response to mitigating information (because it frustrates a desire to blame) but large surges of blame in response to exacerbating information (because it fulfills a desire to blame).
Predictions and Experiments
From the socially regulated blame perspective, the burden of social warrant puts pressure on moral perceivers to have access to criterial information content (intentionality, reasons, and preventability) , and the recently proposed Path Model of Blame describes in detail these information sources and their hierarchical relationships (Malle et al., 2014; Monroe & Malle, 2017) . Applied to the case of judgment updating, the Path Model clarifies how an initial judgment of an ambiguous norm violation will be refined as more information becomes available, making two sets of novel, theoretically grounded predictions.
3 The first set of predictions concerns the gradedness of updates as a function of specific information sources (e.g., intentionality, justified reasons); the second set of predictions concerns the symmetry of mitigating versus exacerbating updates.
Graded Updating
A unique feature of blame according to the Path Model is its hierarchical organization of information processing. Applied to 3 The predictions developed here are not cast in terms of intuitive versus deliberative processes. The Path Model explicitly makes room for both of these modes of processing (Malle et al., 2014, pp. 152, 156, 160, 177) , and our methodology does not aim to differentiate between processing modes. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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blame updating, the model predicts a two-step updating process (see Figure 1) . Blame judgments will be updated at a first level as it becomes clear whether the agent committed the violation intentionally or unintentionally. Similar to other models, the Path Model asserts that intentionality amplifies blame, which is already well supported in the literature (Darley & Shultz, 1990; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Ohtsubo, 2007; Young & Saxe, 2009 ). The Path Model, however, makes the novel claim that intentionality judgments bifurcate moral information processing into two distinct tracks. On the intentional track, perceivers consider an agents' reasons for committing the violation; on the unintentional track, perceivers consider the preventability of the violation (Monroe & Malle, 2017) . This is where the second level of updating occurs.
At this second level, blame judgments will be updated as it becomes clear either (a) whether the agent, if committing the violation intentionally, had good reasons or bad reasons for doing so or (b) whether the violation, if committed unintentionally, was preventable or unpreventable for the agent. Because the second level provides additional information over the first, blame judgments can be updated in a graded manner. For example, relative to initial blame, updated blame will increase when the violation proves to be intentional, but it will increase even more when that intentional violation was committed for bad reasons and decrease substantially when committed for good reasons. Similarly, updated blame will decrease when the violation proves to be unintentional, but it will decrease even more when that unintentional violation was unpreventable and decrease less so when the unintentional violation was clearly preventable.
More precisely, the Path Model of Blame makes three pairs of predictions regarding the gradedness of people's updated moral judgments:
1. Intentionality predictions: Relative to initial blame for a violation whose intentionality is ambiguous, people will (a) decrease (mitigate) blame (22) 4 when they learn that the violation was unintentional and (b) increase (exacerbate) blame (11) when they learn that it was intentional.
Reasons predictions:
Beyond changes after learning only that a violation was intentional (11), when people also learn the agent's specific reasons for the intentional violation, they will (a) increase blame further than for intentional-only if the agent had bad (unjustified) reasons (111) but (b) substantially decrease blame compared with intentional-only if the agent had good (justified) reasons (222). 
Preventability predictions:
Beyond changes after learning only that a violation was unintentional (22), when people also learn about the unintentional violation's preventability, they will (a) decrease blame further than for unintentional-only if the agent could not have prevented the event (222) but (b) decrease blame less than for unintentional-only if the agent could have prevented the event (2).
Symmetric Updating
The socially regulated blame perspective and the Path Model of Blame lead to the hypothesis that, because blaming is an observable, costly, and socially regulated act, perceivers should flexibly revise their blame judgments in response to new relevant evidence, whether that evidence supports increasing or decreasing blame. Inflexible updating would incur social costs-to the offender (when being blamed unfairly), the blamer (when found to have 4 The magnitude of "two arrows" is a reference point that allows additional grades of change (one and three arrows in either direction) that our hypotheses specify. 5 The prediction that morally good reasons strongly mitigate blame may appear counterintuitive at first. However, previous studies have demonstrated the capacity for morally justified reasons to powerfully mitigate blame. For example, Greene et al. (2009) showed that agents' reasons shape people's moral judgments in trolley cases. Describing the switchthrower's reasons for sacrificing one workman as an attempt to save the lives of the other five workmen makes the act appear morally permissible. Similarly, research focusing on both everyday and legal contexts shows that citing beliefs of feeling threatened and acting in self-defense justifies many forms of (even serious) harm (Finkel, Maloney, Valbuena, & Groscup, 1995; Robinson & Darley, 1995) . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
blamed unfairly), or third parties (e.g., when an offender gets away unsanctioned). These potential costs, and the community's interest in minimizing them, puts pressure on moral perceivers to be evenhanded in updating their blame judgments in response to new information. This sets up a pair of predictions about symmetry within the present studies, beyond the gradedness predictions:
4. The blame mitigation in response to learning that an agent unintentionally caused harm will, on average, be of equal magnitude (22) as the blame exacerbation in response to learning that an agent intentionally caused harm (11).
5. The blame mitigation in response to an agent's morally good (justified) reasons for acting will, on average, be of equal magnitude as the blame exacerbation in response to learning about an agent's morally bad (unjustified) reasons for acting.
These predictions contrast with motivated-blame models. Although these models may in principle allow for gradedness predictions (although no extant model specifies them), the question of symmetry arguably differentiates the two perspectives. In particular, the motivated-blame perspective predicts that blame updating should generally be asymmetric-because of "observers' proclivity to favor blame versus nonblame explanations for harmful events and to de-emphasize mitigating circumstances (Alicke, 2000, p. 565) .
The postulated desire to blame should produce large blame surges (111) in response to exacerbating information and relatively smaller blame reductions in response to mitigating information (2). To our knowledge, no current motivated-blame model makes differential predictions about the impact of particular types of mitigating or exacerbating information; we, therefore, represent the increases and decreases of updated blame as uniform within exacerbation and mitigation, respectively (see Table 1 ).
We tested these predictions in six studies using a novel experimental paradigm of moral updating, in which people first receive a sparse description of a norm violation, make an initial blame judgment, receive additional information (that varies in mitigating or exacerbating contents), and make an updated judgment. Study 1 examined moral updating using a student sample and text stimuli. Study 2 recruited a community sample and contrasted the updating condition to a full-information control to evaluate whether people anchor on early blame judgments and asymmetrically adjust in response to mitigating versus exacerbating information. Study 3 further tested this anchoring possibility by comparing the updating condition to a full-information control and a "silent" first judgment control condition. Study 4 replicated our core findings using audio stimuli. Lastly, Study 5 tested whether the predictions of graded blame change and symmetric updating were robust under cognitive load, and Study 6 tested whether the process of making and revising moral judgments is moderated by the transgressor's group membership.
Statistical Power, Generalizability, and Sample Representativeness
For all studies, we report all manipulations and dependent measures. Each study's sample size and stopping rules were determined before data collection. Our studies use a within-subject design (with sixfold stimulus replication per design cell), and an a priori power analysis using G-power recommended a minimum sample size of 36 participants to detect a moderate effect size ( p 2 ϭ .09) with .9 power. Thus, across all of our studies we aimed to collect data from a minimum of 36 participants per condition. Further, we addressed power and the replicability of our findings in two additional ways. First, in Study 4 we substantially expanded sample size (n ϭ 184) to increase power to 1.0. Second, to capture variation of effect sizes across experiments we conducted a metaanalysis of our core findings.
To examine the population generality of our findings we recruited three different samples across our studies. Studies 1 and 5 used student samples, Study 1 from a highly selective private university and Study 5 form a less selective public university. Participants in Studies 3, 4, and 6 were drawn from an Internet sample using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), where participants tend to be older, more diverse, and less educated than college student samples (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014) . Finally, Study 2 used an adult community sample, which tended to be older compared with our college sample and had a level of education attainment that was representative of the United States. Our findings replicate closely across these different participant samples and can be interpreted as generalizing broadly within the context of culturally Western populations.
Study 1 Method
Participants. Participants (n ϭ 60) were students recruited from Brown University's subject pool. Two participants were omitted from the analyses for failing to complete the experiment (final n ϭ 58). The sample was predominantly female (n ϭ 42), and the majority of participants identified as White (57%), with fewer participants identifying as Asian (26%), Black (5%), Latin/ Hispanic (2%), or multiethnic (7%). The sample had an average age of 19.5 years (SD ϭ 1.27). This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Procedure. Participants were tested in groups of two to six people. After participants provided informed consent, they were guided to individual testing rooms equipped with a desktop computer. The experimenter explained that the task involved reading brief descriptions of behavior on the computer and making judgments using an on-screen click-and-drag slider bar. Once participants indicated that they understood the task, the experimenter left the room and participants proceeded through a set of on-screen instructions and completed three practice trials. Then they completed 36 experimental trials divided into three blocks of 12, with a short break between blocks. After finishing the experimental trials, participants completed a brief demographics questionnaire and were debriefed.
Materials.
Computer task. Each experimental trial consisted of four screens displayed in succession. Participants read a short description of a norm-violating event (Screen 1, displayed for 3 s) and made an initial moral judgment ("How much blame does [agent] deserve?") using a click-and-drag slider bar with endpoints of 0 (no blame at all) and 100 (the most blame you would ever give; Screen 2). Immediately afterward participants were presented with new information about the event along with the click-and-drag moral judgment slider bar and were free to update their initial judgment (Screen 3). Finally, participants were asked to "write in their own words what happened" (Screen 4) as a check of their understanding of the stimulus events. Participants were not allowed to revisit previous judgments or information.
Norm-violating event descriptions. Initial event descriptions were designed to cover a range of blameworthy behaviors from relatively minor harm (e.g., "Drew gave a customer incorrect change.") to severe harm (e.g., "Lisa shot Tom in the arm."). The event descriptions were designed to be ambiguous, containing only information about a moral agent, a patient, and a behavior-the minimal information components necessary for judgments of blame (Gray et al., 2012 ; see online supplementary materials for a list of behavior and pretest data).
Information updating. Following the initial moral judgment, participants were presented with one of six new pieces of information about the norm-violating event (see online supplementary materials). This new information described whether the behavior was intentional or unintentional, whether the agent acted for morally good or bad reasons, or whether the agent could have foreseen and prevented the outcome or not. For example, for the initial event "Ted hit a man with his car," a participant would read one of the six types of new information described below:
Intentional ϩ Morally bad reasons:
Ted intentionally hit a man with his car because he was in a hurry and did not feel like waiting on the man to cross the street.
2. Intentional-only: Ted intentionally hit a man with his car.
Intentional ϩ Morally good reasons:
Ted intentionally hit a man with his car because he saw the man had a knife and was chasing a young, frightened woman.
Unintentional ϩ Preventable:
Ted accidentally hit a man with his car. Ted did not check his blind spot before backing up.
Unintentional-only:
Ted accidentally hit a man with his car.
Unintentional ϩ Unpreventable:
Ted accidentally hit a man with his car. Even though they were properly maintained, Ted's brakes failed to work.
The six types of new information were manipulated withinsubjects, but any given participant saw only one new-information version of a given event narrative. In total, participants saw six replications of each type of new information, for a total of 36 events.
Updated blame judgments. To update their blame judgments after receiving new information, participants viewed the blame slider bar, with the pointer set at the position of the initial judgment, and had a chance to reposition it if so desired. To ensure that participants did not feel pressured to alter their initial judgments, instructions explicitly stated that they were not required to change their initial judgment. For each trial we recorded participants' updated blame judgments (i.e., the final position of the slider after participants confirmed their judgments) and then computed a change score of updated blame-initial blame.
Analysis. We tested the three pairs of gradedness predictions and the two symmetry predictions by defining the following within-subject contrasts. (1) Intentionality predictions: (a) Updated blame after people learn that the behavior was intentional (intentional-only trials) increases relative to initial blame; (b) updated blame after people learn that the behavior was unintentional (unintentional-only trials) decreases relative to initial blame. (2) Reasons predictions: (a) When people learn that the intentional behavior was performed for bad reasons blame further increases beyond intentional-only; (b) when people learn that the intentional behavior was performed for good reasons blame decreases relative to intentional-only. (3) Preventability predictions: (a) When people learn that the unintentional behavior was preventable blame decreases less than for unintentional-only; (b) when people learn that the unintentional behavior was unpreventable blame decreases more than for unintentional-only. (4) Symmetry predictions: (4) Blame updates (from initial to final) for intentional-only are indistinguishable in absolute magnitude from blame updates for unintentional-only. (5) Blame updates (from initial to final) for intentional actions performed for bad reasons are indistinguishable in absolute magnitude from blame updates for intentional actions performed for good reasons.
Results
The socially regulated blame model predicts that blame change systematically decreases or increases as a function of an agent's intentionality, reasons, and preventability and that these changes are symmetric regardless of the information's mitigating or exacerbating content. A within-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that new information content explained 84% of the variance in changed blame judgments, F(5, 285) ϭ 305.0, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .84, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.81, 0.86] (see Figure 2 ). More specifically, each of the gradedness predictions was confirmed. (a) Intentionality predictions: Relative to initial blame for the ambiguous behavior, learning that the behavior was intentional exacerbated blame by 21.30 points, t (57) 
Discussion
The framework of socially regulated blame suggests that, because blame evolved for social regulation and is subject to community norms, people are motivated to be relatively systematic in processing blame-relevant information. This systematicity should be particularly salient when people update their judgments, and the Path Model of Blame offers two sets of predictions of how people update blame in this circumstance. First, updates are predicted to be graded as a function of specific information sources (e.g., intentionality, justified reasons), and the results from Study 1 strongly support these predictions. Second, updates are predicted to be symmetric with respect to mitigating versus exacerbating new information, and the results from Study 1 also strongly support these predictions. The latter finding stands in contrast to the motivated-blame perspective, which predicts diminished blame mitigation and enhanced blame exacerbation.
This study has three important limitations. First, it is unclear whether the evidential strength of good versus bad reasons and the convincingness of intentional versus unintentional behaviors were comparable. Therefore, we conducted a follow-up study (n ϭ 120), which showed that, divorced from the context of making a blame judgment, people viewed information about the morally bad reasons and about intentionality as actually more compelling.
6 This result makes any findings of symmetry particularly noteworthy. That is because, in isolation, the updated information, if anything, favored exacerbating blame (stronger bad reasons and more convincing intentionality) over mitigating blame.
A second limitation of Study 1 is that it relies on a sample drawn from a highly selective student population (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) . Thus, it is possible that participants' seemingly systematic use of causal-mental information in moral updat- 6 In the follow up study 60 participants rated how good or bad the agent's reason was (on an 11 point scale from Ϫ5 extremely bad to 5 extremely good) and 60 participants rated how convinced they were that a given behavior was (as claimed) intentional/unintentional (on a Ϫ5 clearly unintentional to 5 clearly intentional scale). Paired t tests showed that people viewed bad reasons (M ϭ 3.41, SD ϭ 1.36) as significantly stronger than they viewed good reasons (M ϭ 1.45, SD ϭ 1.04), t(59) ϭ 10.81, p Ͻ .001. Likewise, paired t tests demonstrated that participants were more convinced by intentional behaviors (M ϭ 3.51, SD ϭ 1.55) than by unintentional behaviors (M ϭ 1.54, SD ϭ 1.84), t(59) ϭ 9.25, p Ͻ .001. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ing reflects their capacity to reason more carefully than the general population. Lastly, one could argue that this study only partially tested the central claim of the motivated-blame models, which is that people anchor on their blame judgments and asymmetrically adjust these initial judgments when encountering new mitigating versus exacerbating information. Study 1 offered no criterion to evaluate the sufficiency of such adjustment. In Study 2 we, therefore, recruited a community sample of participants, and we included a control condition in which participants make a single blame judgment with full information (combining the initial violation description and the subsequent information about intentionality, reasons, etc.), which precludes the impact of an anchor. Considering the level of blame in this full-information condition as the criterion, ordinary anchoring and insufficient adjustment in the two-part (initial-final) judgment condition would consist of overshooting updated blame if initial blame is high and undershooting updated blame if initial blame is low. Beyond that, motivated-blame processing would show asymmetric insufficient adjustment: overshooting when initial blame is high but not undershooting when initial blame is low-in the latter case, people should still substantially increase their blame judgments to satisfy the postulated desire for blame. The predictions derived from the Path Model remain the same as in Study 1: People should update their blame judgments as a result of the specific mitigating and exacerbating information they receive, whether information is presented at once (full-information condition) or in two parts.
Study 2
Study 2 addresses the limitations of Study 1 by using a community sample and by adding a full-information control condition to the design, which tests possible effects of anchoring and insufficient adjustment.
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited from the local RI community using a Craigslist ad for a "Paid research study." Participants who responded to the ad were invited into the lab to participate in the experiment. Participants were paid $20 for participating in the experiment. Out of 107 people who participated in the experiment, 11 were omitted from the analyses because they reported being unable to read. Participants were recruited separately, though simultaneously, 7 for the updating (n ϭ 58) and the full-information control condition (n ϭ 38). Our target sample size for the updating condition was 60 participants (to match Study 1) and 40 participants for the full-information control condition.
Of the 96 participants who completed the experiment, the majority (n ϭ 51) were male; 65% identified as White, 15% as Black, 8% as multiethnic, 6% as Latin/Hispanic, and 2% as Asian. Compared with Study 1, participants in this study were older (M ϭ 32.5 years, SD ϭ 12.4) and represented a diverse range of education. Forty-nine percent reported having a high school education only; 14.6% attained a 2-year degree; 24% attained a 4-year degree; and 11.4% attained a Master's degree or higher.
Procedure and materials. Updating condition. Fifty-eight subjects comprised the updating condition. The stimuli, dependent variables, and procedure were identical to those in Study 1.
Full-information control condition. Thirty-eight subjects comprised the full-information control condition. The stimuli and dependent variables were identical to those in the updating condition, but in this condition participants received both the description of the norm-violating event and the mental or causal information in one sentence (e.g., "Tommy intentionally left the restaurant without leaving the waiter a tip because he did not want to waste money on being nice."). After participants read this information they were asked to make a single blame judgment using the click-and-drag slider bar that ranges from 0 (no blame at all) to 100 (the most blame you would ever give).
Results
Updating blame judgments. A within-subjects ANOVA first tested the effects of new information on blame change within the updating condition, as a replication of Study Comparing the updating and full-information conditions. This study more directly contrasts predictions of the socially regulated blame and the motivated-blame models by comparing the updating condition with a full-information control condition. A 7 Piloting revealed that the length of the experiment differed significantly between the updating condition (45 min) and the control condition (25 min). Because of the time difference between the two conditions, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) instructed that we advertise and recruit separately for the two conditions to ensure equitable compensation for participants. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
2 (presentation condition) ϫ 6 (new information) mixed between/ within ANOVA showed that across both conditions, new information explained 72% of the variance in updated blame judgments,
The motivated-blame perspective predicts that people in the updating condition, relative to the full-information condition, should show asymmetric anchoring patterns, leading to overall more blame for both exacerbation and mitigation. Contradicting this prediction, presentation condition had no impact on average levels of blame, F(1, 94) ϭ 1.46, p ϭ .23, p 2 ϭ .015, 95% CI [0.00, 0.09]. There was a small information by condition interaction, suggesting that some changes because of new information were different in the two presentation conditions, F(5, 470) ϭ 3.24, p ϭ .007, p 2 ϭ .033, 95% CI [0.003, 0.06]. We decomposed this interaction term into the hypothesis-relevant gradedness contrasts, asking whether any of these predictions was moderated by information presentation.
(1) The intentionality predictions were affected by presentation in a way that partially supported the motivated-blame prediction. The increase from initial to updated blame for intentional events was significantly higher in the updating condition (M ϭ 22.99, SD ϭ 15.14) than in the full-information condition 8 (M ϭ 12.08, SD ϭ 18.88), t(94) ϭ 3.00, p ϭ .003, d ϭ 0.65, 95% CI [0.22, 1.07]. On the side of unintentional events, the results were inconclusive. The drop from initial to updated blame for unintentional events was weaker, but not significantly so, in the updating condition (M ϭ Ϫ19.51, SD ϭ 22.96) than in the full-information control condition (M ϭ Ϫ25.46, SD ϭ 24.66), t(94) ϭ 1.26, p ϭ .21, d ϭ 0.25, 95% CI [Ϫ0.16, 0.67].
(2) The reasons predictions were also affected, but opposite to what the motivated-blame perspective would predict. The blame boost when learning that an agent acted for bad reasons (relative to learning merely that the agent acted intentionally) was smaller in the updating condition (M ϭ 1.90, SD ϭ 14.13) than in the full-information condition (M ϭ 10.08, SD ϭ 16.72), t(94) ϭ 2.58, p ϭ .011, d ϭ 0.54, 95% CI [0.12, 0.96] . This suggests that when people update reason information they exacerbate blame relatively less than under full information. On the side of good reasons, presentation also had an impact, but again counter to the motivated blame perspective. The blame drop when learning that an agent acted for good reasons (relative to learning merely that the agent acted intentionally) was larger in the updating condition (M ϭ Ϫ55.96, SD ϭ 22.62) than in the full-information condition (M ϭ Ϫ38.67, SD ϭ 19.99), t(94) ϭ 3.81, p Ͻ .0001, d ϭ 0.80, 95% CI [0.37, 1.22] . This suggests that when people update reason information people mitigate blame more than under full information.
(3) The preventability predictions were not affected by presentation condition. The weaker blame mitigation when learning that an unintentional event was preventable (rather than merely unintentional) did not differ between the updating condition (M ϭ 7.84, SD ϭ 21.90) and the full-information condition (M ϭ 10.95, SD ϭ 18.97), t(94) ϭ 0.72, p ϭ .48, d ϭ 0.15, 95% CI [Ϫ0.26, 0.56]. Similarly, the stronger blame mitigation when learning that an unintentional event was unpreventable (rather than just unintentional) did not differ between the updating condition (M ϭ Ϫ10.40, SD ϭ 24.14) and the full-information control condition (M ϭ Ϫ8.31, SD ϭ 16.54), t(94) ϭ 0.47, p ϭ .64, d ϭ 0.10, 95% CI [Ϫ0.32, 0.51]. 8 The full information condition had no "initial" blame ratings, so for the present analyses we rescaled updated blame judgments in both conditions by subtracting the specific initial blame ratings for each information condition (e.g., for intentional-only in the full-information group, subtract the intentional-only initial-blame rating from the updating group). This step makes it easier to interpret the results in terms of the sets of gradedness predictions, but statistically it corresponds to an analysis of the updated blame judgments as they are shown in Figure 4 . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
In summary, updated blame judgments were on average indistinguishable from blame under full information, but some variations across information types emerged. In two comparisons (one significant), updated blame patterns were consistent with what a motivated-blame hypothesis would suggest; in four comparisons (two significant) updated blame patterns were inconsistent with what a motivated-blame hypothesis would suggest.
Discussion
This study closely replicated the results of Study 1. Using a community sample, we showed that people update blame judgments in a graded and symmetric fashion when new mental or causal information becomes available. Further, examining the pattern of blame change revealed the powerful impact of causalmental state information on moral judgment consistent with previous research (Cushman, 2008; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Martin & Cushman, 2016; Monroe & Reeder, 2011; Plaks, McNichols, & Fortune, 2009; Reeder, Monroe, & Pryor, 2008; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006; Young & Saxe, 2009) . By contrast, we did not find consistent evidence that people anchored and asymmetrically updated their moral judgments in favor of increasing or maintaining blame.
By comparing the updating condition with a full-information control condition we provided a more appropriate contrast of the two theoretical models and found further evidence for the socially regulated blame perspective and the Path Model of Blame. Whether people made a single judgment or updated an initial judgment, they were comparably sensitive to mental state information and arrived at largely identical blame judgments. These data are suggestive of a flexible moral system that makes considerable adjustments in moral judgments if the available evidence favors such changes (see Mende-Siedlecki & Todorov, 2016 for similar findings in a nonmoral domain). One exception to this broad pattern of findings was the comparison between updating in the "intentional" and the "intentional-with-bad-reasons" information conditions. Participants appeared to equate these two information conditions, which may reflect default assumptions about intentional behavior being normally performed for bad reasons. That is, if one hears that "Steve intentionally punched Mark," one might suspect that Steve had morally unjustified reasons for this action. Whether such a default assumption constitutes a motivated bias is unclear, as we do not know the actual base rates of intentional norm violations performed for justified versus unjustified reasons.
One aspect of the present paradigm may have favored flexible, systematic updating: asking people to make explicit initial judgments. For one thing, demanding such a judgment might reduce the natural ambiguity of violations (because one has to commit to a certain construal); for another, demanding two public judgments (an initial and an updated one) might put pressure on people to show that they are properly taking the initial information into account. By itself, such experimental demand cannot explain the specific ordinal patterns of mitigated and exacerbated blame we found in Studies 1 and 2; but removing it would strengthen the interpretation that people spontaneously update their blame judgments in the predicted manner. Thus, Study 3 used a modified updating condition in which people are invited to make a silent, undisclosed judgment in response to the ambiguous initial information and then make a single public judgment after the new information is revealed. Such a situation might also more closely resemble the everyday process of moral judgment, wherein people likely have initial moral reactions but do not express them until more information is presented.
Study 3
In Study 3 we compare the standard updating condition to a "silent" initial judgment condition and also use a full information control condition, as in Study 2. According to the socially regulated blame perspective, people's moral judgments are based on This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
agents' mental state information regardless of whether early judgments are silent or explicit. The social demand for warrant (fair judgment based on evidence) is strong enough to guide people's initial judgment, the information updating process, and the public judgment. Thus, the socially regulated blame model predicts that blame should change as a function of the agent's mental states, and updated blame judgments should show the same pattern of blame shown in Studies 1 and 2 across the updating, silent initial judgment, and the full-information conditions. Contrastingly, according to the motivated-blame perspective, a silent, unchecked initial judgment of a highly ambiguous scenario should activate people's desire to blame and drive a motivated-blame process when integrating new information, wherein they are more responsive to exacerbating information than mitigating information.
Method
Participants. Subjects (n ϭ 120) were recruited from MTurk and randomly assigned to either an updating (n ϭ 40), a full information (n ϭ 40), or a silent initial judgment condition (n ϭ 40). Average age in the sample was 35.2 years (SD ϭ 10.9). The sample was evenly split between men (n ϭ 59) and women (n ϭ 58), with three participants declining to indicate their sex. The majority of participants identified as White (n ϭ 94), with fewer people identifying as Black (n ϭ 6), Latin/Hispanic (n ϭ 7), Asian (n ϭ 7), or multiethnic (n ϭ 2).
Procedure and materials. Procedures and materials were identical to Study 2 with one change: this study included a silent initial judgment condition in addition to the updating, and the full-information control condition (described above). In the silent initial judgment condition, each experimental trial consisted of three screens displayed in succession. In each trial, participants read a short description of a norm-violating event (Screen 1) and were asked to "make a judgment (just in your own head) about the person. Once you've made this private judgment, click the button on the screen to move on." On the following screen (Screen 2), participants read the updating information and were asked, "How much blame does [agent] deserve?" Participants made their responses using a click-and-drag slider bar with endpoints of 0 (no blame at all) and 100 (the most blame you would ever give). Finally, participants were asked to "write in a few words what happened" (Screen 3) as a check of their understanding of the stimuli. As in previous studies, participants were not allowed to revisit previous judgments or information.
Results
A 3 (presentation condition) ϫ 6 (new information) mixed between/within ANOVA showed that participants in all three information presentation conditions arrived at markedly similar blame judgments (see Figure 5) , and overall, new information explained 78% of the variance in updated blame judgments, F(5, 585) ϭ 414.6, p Ͻ .0001, 2 ϭ .78, 95% CI [0.75, 0.80]. Presentation condition did not significantly affect average levels of blame, F(2, 117) ϭ 0.14, p ϭ .87, p 2 ϭ .002, 95% CI [0.00, 0.03], and the presentation by new information interaction was marginally significant F(10, 585) ϭ 1.71, p ϭ .076, p 2 ϭ .028, 95% CI [0.00, 0.04]. As in Study 2, we decomposed this interaction term into the hypothesis-relevant gradedness contrasts, asking whether any of these predictions was moderated by information presentation.
(1) Both of the intentionality predictions were confirmed, one with a moderation of information presentation. (a) Across information presentation conditions, participants' blame levels were higher in response to learning that an agent acted intentionally (M diff ϭ 19.20, SD ϭ 13.80) than initial blame, 
Discussion
Study 3 offered further support for the socially regulated blame framework and the predictions of the Path Model of Blame. Mental and causal information systematically influenced moral judgments, and this effect held largely regardless of whether people updated an initial moral judgment, made a single judgment with full information, or made a private judgment before learning about the agent's mind. 9 Because the silent first and full information conditions had no known initial blame scores we subtracted the updating condition's corresponding initial blame score from all three conditions and effectively tested the resulting scores against zero. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Under the condition most conducive to motivated blame (silent first judgment), there was no evidence of muted mitigation, only one case of slightly stronger blame when the behavior was intentional. Together, the first three studies demonstrate that people reliably update blame judgments in a graded and symmetric fashion. That is, people systematically update their judgments of blame as a function of an agent's mental states (e.g., intentionality, justified reasons), even making such fine-grained distinctions as between intentionally harming compared with intentionally harming for morally bad versus good reasons. Further, comparing moral updating to a full-information control condition, we find no evidence that people's initial moral judgments provide anchors that bias them toward asymmetric adjustments (such as more exacerbation or less mitigation).
In Study 4 we sought to demonstrate the robustness of these findings under tighter stimulus exposure conditions by converting all of the experimental stimuli (i.e., initial event descriptions and new information) into audio stimuli. The use of audio stimuli removes nonsystematic variation because of reading times and allays concerns that participants may preferentially revisit mitigating information in the experimental context, allowing them to process such information more carefully than they would under normal circumstances. In addition, in this replication we recruited a sample three times larger than the updating condition samples in the first three studies.
Study 4 Method
Participants. Participants (n ϭ 200) were recruited from MTurk. Sixteen participants failed to complete the experiment and were omitted from the analyses (final n ϭ 184). 10 The majority of participants were female (58%) and White (75%), with smaller numbers of participants identifying as Black (9%), Latin/Hispanic (9%), Asian (3%), or multiethnic (2%). The average age of participants was 32.9 years (SD ϭ 10.3).
Procedure and materials.
Procedures and materials were identical to Study 1 with one exception. In the current study, the initial and new information were presented as audio streams (rather than as on-screen text). The audio stimuli were 2-4 s long, recorded with neutral affect by a female speaker voice who had no knowledge of the research hypotheses. After each audio segment, the program automatically advanced to the relevant judgment screen (either initial blame or updated blame). Thus, participants listened to a short description of a norm-violating event (Screen 1), made an initial moral judgment (Screen 2), listened to the updating information (Screen 3), and finally had an opportunity to update their blame judgment (Screen 4). Participants were not able to return to previous screens.
Results
Replicating previous studies, new information explained 75% of the variance in changed blame judgments, F(5, 915) ϭ 548.8, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .75, 95% CI [0.72, 0.77] (see Figure 6 ). Also, all of the gradedness predictions were confirmed. (a) Relative to initial blame, learning that an event was intentional increased people's blame by 21.20 points, t (183) 10 The 16 participants who were removed from the analyses completed fewer than 20% of the experimental trials. All data removal was conducted before data analysis. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
tionality alone, t (183) We also examined the symmetry predictions using corresponding pairs of exacerbating and mitigating information. 
Discussion
Study 4 offers further evidence for the predictions of the Path Model of Blame and the broader framework of socially regulated moral judgment. People's blame judgments reliably and systematically tracked the mental states and causal contributions of agents, differentiating in a graded and symmetric way between different kinds of mitigating and exacerbating information updates. Note. CI ϭ confidence interval. All result are based on random effects models across four studies, with inverse variance weights to correct for imprecision. Q is the degree of heterogeneity among studies, tested against the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity. Boldfaced entries are ones that were predicted to differ from zero in the indicated directed. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Meta-analysis.
To demonstrate the consistency of findings from Studies 1 through 4 we conducted a meta-analysis of the effect sizes for the three pairs of gradedness predictions and the pair symmetry predictions. Table 2 shows that all six gradedness predictions were supported, with sufficient homogeneity across the four studies, despite varying participant populations and varying stimulus presentations. Likewise, we found evidence for the two symmetry hypotheses, in the sense that a motivated-blame prediction of greater exacerbation than mitigation could not be supported (the reasons symmetry test tended to go even in the opposite direction, suggesting greater mitigation than exacerbation).
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Study 5
Despite these consistent results, the natural context of everyday blaming may involve cognitive distractions or a lack of motivation to engage in effortful cognition, which the previous studies did not incorporate. Thus, the studies may have inflated the evidence for our predictions because they allowed participants ample time and resources to engage in the kind of effortful cognition that is necessary to override otherwise influential biases. We tested this possibility in Study 5 by reducing the cognitive resources available to participants and examining whether the predictions of graded blame change and symmetric updating were robust under cognitive load. The socially regulated blame perspective implies such robustness, because the repeated demand to have warrant for blame judgments makes the requisite information processing of causal and mental information fast and effortless (Barrett, Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005; Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2008; Malle & Holbrook, 2012; Monroe & Malle, 2017) . We manipulated cognitive load by randomly assigning participants to update their moral judgments either as usual or while producing a series of random taps with their index finger. Previous research has shown the tapping task to be effective at targeting executive functioning, while leaving secondary mechanisms, such as the phonological loop, unaffected (Stuyven, Van der Goten, Vandierendonck, Claeys, & Crevits, 2000) . Because the socially regulated blame perspective predicts no change in information processing as function of cognitive load, we included a Stroop task as a manipulation check for the cognitive load manipulation. In this way, we could ascertain that the tapping task successfully placed participants in a state of cognitive load (slower responses and more errors on the Stroop task) independent of whether cognitive load alters people's updated blame judgments.
Method
Participants. Participants (n ϭ 80) were students recruited from Florida State University's psychology subject pool. Two participants failed to complete the experiment and were omitted from the analyses (final n ϭ 78). Participants were randomly assigned to cognitive load condition (n standard ϭ 38; n load ϭ 40).
Procedure and materials. Procedures and materials were identical to Study 4 except that the current study included a between-subjects manipulation of cognitive load. In the standard condition, participants listened to a description of a norm-violating event, made an initial moral judgment, heard new information about the event, were invited to update their moral judgment, and finally typed their description of the event. In the cognitive load condition, participants listened to the event description and made their initial moral judgments as usual; however, participants were instructed to produce a series of random taps with their left hand during the presentation of the new information and while updating their judgments. In addition to the magnitude of blame judgments we also recorded response times for those judgments to determine the possible impact of cognitive load.
The cognitive load manipulation. The cognitive load task, labeled the "tapping task," was adapted from Stuyven et al. (2000) . Participants were asked to produce a series of random taps with their left index finger on the desk. They were instructed to tap at least once every second and to try to be as random as possible.
With the experimenter present, participants listened to two audio examples of random taps and practiced tapping during two updating trials. After the practice trials, the experimenter gave every participant verbal feedback, saying "That was good, but try to be even more unpredictable during the experimental trials. Remember that you need to focus on making your tapping as random as possible." The experimenter then left the room and participants completed the moral judgment task. As in the standard condition, participants listened to the event description and made their initial moral judgments. Before the presentation of the new information, a male voice instructed them to "Begin tapping." Participants tapped with their left hands during the presentation of the new information and while they updated their blame judgments. After making the updated judgment, the same male voice instructed participants to "Stop tapping," and then participants were asked to type a brief description of the event.
The Stroop task. After the moral judgment task participants completed the Stroop task. They were asked to make speeded responses to on-screen stimuli. In each trial, participants were presented with a word (BLUE, RED, YELLOW, or GREEN) written in different colors of font (Blue, Red, Yellow, or Green). They were told that if the word appeared in blue font to press "B;" if the word appeared in a red font to press "R;" and similarly for words in green (press "G") and yellow (press "Y"). For congruent trials the word (e.g., GREEN) matched the font color, whereas for incongruent trials it did not (e.g., GREEN appeared in red font). Performance in the Stroop task was measured by response time (RT) and number of errors (e.g., pressing "G" for the word GREEN displayed in blue font) in the incongruent trials relative to the congruent trials.
Participants who had been assigned to the cognitive load condition for the moral judgment task also experienced cognitive load in the Stroop task, tapping randomly with their left hand while pressing letters on the keyboard to indicate the stimulus words' font color. 12 11 There is a seeming discrepancy between the fact that we found symmetry between intentional and unintentional updating but the individual (absolute) effect sizes appear to differ: d ϭ 1.49 for intentional-only and 0.96 for unintentional-only. This may be explained by the fact that the intentional-only condition often had smaller SDs and largely similar mean differences, therefore, received better d values.
12 Stroop data from five participants was lost because of an experimenter error. Thus, the dataset for the Stroop task includes 36 participants in the control condition, and 37 participants in the cognitive load condition. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check: The Stroop task. A 2 condition (cognitive load vs. standard) ϫ 2 trial type (congruent vs. incongruent) mixed between/within ANOVA revealed the predicted main effect of cognitive load on participants' response times. Regardless of trial type, participants under cognitive load labeled the font colors more slowly (M ϭ 1,119 ms, SD ϭ 189 ms) than participants in the standard condition (M ϭ 1,019 ms, SD ϭ 184 ms), F(1, 71) The cognitive load manipulation did, however, significantly affect the speed with which people updated their blame judgments, t(76) ϭ 2.22, p ϭ .029, d ϭ 0.50, 95% CI [0.05, 0.95]. Participants under cognitive load took significantly longer (M ϭ 4,260 ms, SD ϭ 1165) than participants in the control condition (M ϭ 3,729 ms, SD ϭ 926). Thus, cognitive load did reduce the efficiency of moral judgment responses but not the systematic manner in which people adjusted their moral judgments in response to new information.
As cognitive load did not affect blame change and did not interact with updating information, we averaged across the cognitive load and the standard conditions when evaluating the gradedness and symmetry predictions. 13 Replicating our previous studies we confirmed all of the gradedness predictions. (a) For intentionality, the data show that, relative to initial blame, intentional events exacerbated blame by 20.55 points, t (77) Lastly, we found partial support for the two symmetry predictions. (d) For intentionality, blame change for intentional events (M ϭ 20.55, SD ϭ 11.44) was slightly larger than change for unintentional events (M ϭ 17.11, SD ϭ 13.87), t (77) 
Discussion
Study 5 tested the hypothesis that flexible time and ample resources in the previous studies may have allowed participants to engage in graded and symmetric moral updating. Under more limited resources brought about by cognitive load, this systematic processing should suffer and potentially reveal deeper tendencies for motivated blame. Results revealed that although the load manipulation successfully limited people's cognitive resources (as evidenced by impaired Stroop task performance), causal and mental information remained a powerful and systematic determinant of blame change. This finding highlights the robustness of the socially regulated blame framework and the predictions of the Path Model. Further, this study suggests that the findings in Studies 1-4 capture people's default method for arriving at (and revising) moral judgments rather than a process benefitting from an artificial or cognitively permissive paradigm.
Study 6
In multiple studies we have now demonstrated consistent evidence for the predictions of the Path Model of Blame and the broader framework of socially regulated blame. Despite robust evidence of systematic moral updating, however, it is unlikely that the process of making and revising moral judgments is impervious to bias. In fact, the socially regulated blame perspective suggests one factor that may instill such bias: The norm transgressor's group membership. Demand for warrant in moral judgments is the pressure that a community puts on its members to maintain fair and justified moral regulation; however, such pressure may not extend to members of outgroups. Indeed, previous research has documented that people infer negative or sinister motives for the ambiguous behavior of political outgroups (Hulsizer, Munro, Fagerlin, & Taylor, 2004; Munro, Weih, & Tsai, 2010; Reeder, Pryor, Wohl, & Griswell, 2005) , and outgroup members tend to be punished more harshly than ingroup members (Lieberman & Linke, 2007; Schiller, Baumgartner, & Knoch, 2014; Tajfel, 1970) .
Therefore, in Study 6 we tested whether a transgressor's outgroup identity limits people's systematic moral updating and reveals motivated bias in causal and mental information processing. In particular, we examined whether the gradedness and symmetry of blame judgments are altered when judging outgroup transgressors. To manipulate ingroup/outgroup status we recruited strongly identified political partisans (Democrats or Republicans) and asked them to complete a modified moral updating experiment. 13 Effects broken out by cognitive load versus control are indistinguishable from the overall analysis. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
After each ambiguous event description participants made their initial moral judgments, then learned about the transgressor's political affiliation (Democrat for half of the trials, Republican for the other half), and received, as usual, the new causal or mental state information. Thus, the transgressor's ingroup/outgroup status was a within-subject factor, tailored to the two participant groups of political supporters.
Method
Participants. We recruited 120 participants (60 self-identified Democrats and 60 Republicans) for a study entitled "Politics and Moral Judgment" using MTurk. Four participants failed to complete the experiment and were omitted from the analyses. To obtain our Democrat and Republican sample, we posted two identical HITs, one recruiting self-identified Democrats (n ϭ 58) and the other recruiting self-identified Republicans (n ϭ 58). The HITs were posted simultaneously, and participants could only complete one version of the study. Each HIT had a stopping rule of n ϭ 60.
The samples were comparable in age (M Rep ϭ 38.3, SD ϭ 13.6; M Dem ϭ 37.2, SD ϭ 13.2), though other demographic differences emerged. There were fewer women in the Republican sample (n ϭ 23) than in the Democratic sample (n ϭ 30), and the Republican sample had a higher proportion of participants who identified as White (88%, n ϭ 51) compared with the Democratic sample (67%, n ϭ 39), though neither of these differences attained conventional statistical significance (p ϭ .151 and p ϭ .074, respectively). On a scale from 0 (not at all religious) to 6 (very religious), Republican participants were more religious (M ϭ 4.00, SD ϭ 2.03) than Democratic participants (M ϭ 1.67, SD ϭ Procedure and materials. Participants completed a moral updating task modified from Study 1. Participants first learned about an ambiguous immoral event (e.g., "Tommy left the restaurant without leaving the waiter a tip.") and made an initial moral judgment using a click-and-drag slider bar with endpoints of 0 (no blame at all) and 100 (the most blame you would ever give).
14 Immediately afterward participants were presented with the updating information, which included the transgressor's political affiliation (e.g., "Tommy, a long-time Democrat, accidentally left the restaurant without leaving the waiter a tip."). Participants were then allowed to update their initial blame judgment. After participants submitted their blame judgment they were asked to recall the transgressor's political affiliation ("What political party does Tommy belong to?"). Participants completed a total of 12 updating trials (6 Democrat transgressors, 6 Republican transgressors).
Results
We conducted a 2 (transgressors' ingroup vs. outgroup membership) ϫ 6 (new information) within-subjects ANOVA on blame change scores. New information explained 55% of variance in changed blame judgments, F(5, 575) ϭ 139. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
specific information conditions, so we tested the interaction term for each of the three pairs of predictions, following the overall prediction tests reported below. Gradedness predictions.
(1) Compared with the ambiguous initial event descriptions, events described as merely intentional increased blame by 24.56 points, t (115) 
Discussion
In Study 6 a picture emerges in which moral perceivers blame outgroup members more overall (5 points on a 0 -100 scale) than they blame ingroup members. This slightly harsher blame toward outgroup members breaks the updating symmetry consistently found in all five previous studies: for outgroup members, people mitigate less than they exacerbate blame (their initial blame judgments for the ambiguous first piece of information did not differ). However, even for outgroup members, people process new information in systematic and graded fashion as they do for ingroup members.
We can better understand these patterns of moral judgment for ingroup and outgroup members by comparing blame updating for these group targets with the average blame updating for individuals from Studies 1-5 15 (see Figure 8 ). This analysis reveals two key patterns. First, blame updating for ingroup targets never differs from that for individual targets (ps Ͼ .15). Second, bias against outgroup members is limited to more reluctant mitigation for the two conditions in which updating is maximally mitigating (i.e., good reasons, unpreventable accidents; ps Ͻ .022).
These findings indicate that the social requirement for warrant is equally forceful for judgments of ingroup members as it is for everyday judgments where group membership is not salient. This result is broadly consistent with previous research showing that people are motivated to punish deviant ingroup members to teach moral rules or to preserve group cohesion (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Cushman, 2013; Fehr & Gächter, 2002) . Additionally, the data suggest that there is room for bias in blame judgments across group boundaries, but the pattern is not simply one of a stronger "desire to blame" (that should result in greater exacerbation). Instead, relaxing the requirement for warrant when judging outgroups may introduce the specter of bias by causing people to become actively skeptical of generally powerful mitigating information (e.g., an agent's good reasons or inability to prevent harm).
General Discussion
The socially regulated perspective on blame suggests that because blame evolved as a form of costly social regulation, people are motivated to make blame judgments that would be considered fair and warranted by other moral perceivers in the social community. Thus, people systematically attend to evidence that can warrant a given blame judgment, including information about agents' mental states, their causal contributions to an outcome, and counterfactuals about the preventability of the outcome. Such systematic information processing should come into clear view when people have to update their blame judgments in response to new information. The present data support this hypothesis. 15 We chose to use all five studies (not just the four on which our earlier meta-analysis was based) because Study 5 showed no differences between cognitive load and the standard condition, and the two together showed no notable differences from the average of Studies 1-4 (average difference in blame change means was 1.01, ranging from Ϫ2.50 to 3.37 across the six new information conditions). Further, we chose to conduct an analysis of mean comparisons rather than one of effect size comparisons because Study 6 used only half of the number of items per new information condition and, therefore, had considerably higher SDs than the previous five studies, making the scaling of effect sizes between Study 6 and Studies 1-5 incommensurable. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Studies using student samples (Study 1 and 5), community samples (Study 2), and Internet samples (Studies 3 to 4, 6) demonstrated consistent support for three gradedness predictions: (a) Relative to initial blame for a violation whose intentionality is ambiguous, people increased blame when they learned that a violation was intentional and decreased blame when they learned that a violation was unintentional. (b) Over and above changes because of intentionality, people increased blame when an agent acted for morally bad reasons and decreased blame substantially when an agent acted for morally good reasons. (c) Beyond changes after learning only that a violation was unintentional, people reduced blame less when an event was clearly preventable; however, when events were unpreventable people made even larger reductions in blame relative to unintentionality alone. These findings highlight the central role of causal and mental state information in the process of rendering blame judgments, and they are broadly consistent with previous research on single moral judgments (Cushman, 2008; Greene et al., 2009; Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Monroe & Reeder, 2011; Young & Saxe, 2009 ).
Additionally, the present studies confirmed two symmetry predictions. The socially regulated blame perspective makes the unique prediction that because blaming is a socially costly act, perceivers should flexibly revise their blame judgments in response to any new relevant evidence, regardless of whether that evidence supports increasing or decreasing blame. The data bear out this claim. Examining the absolute magnitude of blame change showed that blame mitigation in response to learning that an agent unintentionally caused harm was equal to the blame exacerbation in response to learning that an agent intentionally caused harm. Similarly, blame mitigation in response to an agent's morally good reasons was equal to the blame exacerbation in response to an agent's morally bad reasons for acting.
Confirmation of the symmetry predictions is especially notable because they contrast with a key prediction of motivated-blame models. Such models predict that blame change should be asymmetrically biased against blame mitigation. Studies 1-5 showed little evidence supporting this bias prediction. The only exception to symmetry was in Study 6, when people made judgments of outgroup members. In this context, the community pressure to form fair and justified moral judgments is reduced and, indeed, we found that people's blame judgments were no longer symmetric and showed a bias toward overblaming outgroup members. Even so, mental state information had a strong impact on blame updating, accounting for nearly eight times as much variance in people's judgments ( p 2 ϭ .55) as did the ingroup/outgroup manipulation ( p 2 ϭ .071). Thus, bias coexisted with evidence-based information processing.
Theoretical Integration and Novel Predictions
The consistent pattern of graded and symmetric moral updating across a wide set of everyday moral infractions challenges the dominant view that moral information processing is routinely biased by early emerging moral judgments. However, these studies do not negate the possibility of motivational bias in blame. The social psychological literature is replete with examples of bias in social and moral judgments, and blame is no exception. Thus, although the studies here examine a situation where the socially regulated blame and motivated-blame models make divergent predictions, we do not believe that these theories are, on the whole, mutually exclusive. Rather, the two theories are compatible insofar as they apply to different conditions of blaming.
When people are in a third-party role and consider everyday moral violations, when they have access to at least some causal-mental information, or when they make judgments across multiple different agents who are not obviously outgroup members, then their concern for evidence-based blame judgments is activated and the Path Model of Blame successfully accounts for their judgments. However, when people confront extreme acts of harm, make a single isolated judgment about an outgroup member, or when their judgments are anon- Figure 8 . Targets' political group membership led to partially asymmetrical updating. People blamed political outgroup members more overall and in particular were less willing to mitigate for good reasons or unpreventable accidents. Error bars represent Ϯ1 SE. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ymous and unchecked, motivated blame processes likely take hold. For example, in cases of personal injury to oneself or a loved one, people may not want to let the perpetrator "off the hook" (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock et al., 2007) , and they may give less weight to intentionality or preventability and be more guided by their own desire to see the person be punished. Central to the socially regulated perspective is the claim that social demands for warrant motivate systematic moral information processing and judgments of blame. What follows from this contention is that intensifying or relaxing the requirement for warrant should modulate whether people are relatively more systematic or more biased in their judgments.
When the requirement for warrant is especially strong-for example, when blame is face-to-face, when social observers are present, or when one expects repeated interactions with the offender-perceivers are predicted to seek out morally relevant information and make graded, evenhanded use of such information. When the requirement for warrant is relaxed-for example, when evaluating outgroup members about whom social observers care less, or when no social observers are present-perceivers are predicted to take short-cuts in seeking morally relevant information, become prone to asymmetric information processing, and render harsher blame judgments. A case in point are moral judgments expressed online (e.g., on Reddit, Twitter, or Facebook), where demands for warrant are paltry because people are anonymous, or address only ingroup members, and incur few costs for overblaming others. Crockett (2017) suggests that people express harsher moral condemnation online in part because of a supportive audience of like-minded others, a reduced risk of retaliation, and the ability to hide in a crowd.
Finally, the socially regulated perspective emphasizes a distinction between person-focused judgments of blame, for which warrant is necessary, and behavior-focused judgments of badness or wrongness, which are less costly and less socially regulated (Voiklis & Malle, 2017) . While people must be able to justify why the target of their blame judgment deserves the expressed amount of blame, calling an action wrong does not entail the same justificatory standard. Thus, whereas person-focused judgments of blame tend to be sensitive to causal-mental evidence and to the agreement or disagreement of social observers, behavior-focused judgments are less evidencebased, more susceptible to anchoring and asymmetrical adjustment, and less influenced by the presence or opinion of social observers.
Limitations and Future Directions for Research
Verbal stimuli and third-person perspective. A limitation of the present studies is that all of the stimuli are witness reports, verbally communicated to a third-party moral judge. This is the typical way in which theories of moral judgment are tested (including previous work on biases in blame), and it does constrain the generalizability of the results. In the present case, one might worry in particular about the minimalist initial reports about a violation (e.g., "Mark shot Frank"), which place a significant interpretational burden on perceivers. However, this burden is not unlike that put on consumers of daily news headlines (e.g., "Trump says to skip due process for those here illegally"; "Teenager missing after walking away from migrant center"-New York Times, 6/25/18). These headlines are designed to engage people, cause an evaluative response, and encourage them to seek further information, and this is just the situation our participants found themselves when asked to update their moral judgments. Nevertheless, we currently do not know how well these results match judgments arising from directly observed violations, when moral perceivers may be overcome with personal feelings of threat or outrage. When perceivers are themselves victims, or when they are personally connected to the victim, blame judgments must deal with a unique emotional potential that could bias the moral processing (Patil, Calò, Fornasier, Cushman, & Silani, 2017) and lead to post hoc justifications of preferred moral judgments (Alicke et al., 2011; Haidt, 2001) .
The influence of emotion on moral updating. Research shows that manipulations of emotion can have a powerful effect on at least some types of moral judgment (Ask & Pina, 2011; Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) . The present studies do not capture the full emotional dimension of moral judgments, and it seems unlikely that blame updating is immune to the effects of emotion. Exactly how emotion influences updated blame judgments is an important question for future research. One possibility is that negative emotional reactions (e.g., anger or disgust) amplify the intensity of people's moral judgments directly (Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011) , creating harsher moral judgments overall without structurally changing the underlying information processing (about causality, intentionality, etc.). Alternatively, negative emotions may change information processing itself. Emotions may cause people to skip over critical pieces of evidence, adopt simple heuristics (e.g., "if you did it, then you're to blame"), or rely on preset values for morally relevant criteria (e.g., "these people always mean to hurt you"), resulting, for example, in an "intentionality bias" (Bègue, Bushman, Giancola, Subra, & Rosset, 2010; Rosset, 2008) .
Conclusion
People make mistakes, in moral judgments as in nonmoral judgments. However, we have learned, from these and other studies, that in many situations people make graded, sophisticated judgments. Two unique aspects of moral judgments make them perhaps more systematic than many others.
First, moral judgments are used for social regulation-to curtail and reform other people's behavior (Voiklis & Malle, 2017) . If these judgments were often misguided or out of proportion, they would be ineffective at regulating others' behavior. In many respects modern society has succeeded remarkably in such regulation, enabling countless forms of coordination and cooperation among small groups and large crowds, and fostering civility to an extent that is arguably unsurpassed in human history (Pinker, 2011) . The success of this social regulation attests to the success of moral judgment to support such regulation.
Second, moral judgments are themselves under social regulation. Because moral judgments, when socially expressed, can hurt or harm the target, there are norms in place to demand the judgments to be fair and proportional. A community that condones outrageous and exaggerated blame and punishment will not succeed, because such unfair moral criticism leads to anger, retaliation, and perceptions of injustice. Successful communities, therefore, demand of their members to render reasonably thoughtful and evidence-based moral judgments, especially blame judgments, which are directed at persons and, therefore, most costly when unfounded.
Many domains of psychology have moved away from merely recounting the errors that humans commit and have turned instead to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
investigating bounded rationality and relatively calibrated judgments under uncertainty. This is surely not to claim perfection of the human mind. However, scientists might do well to respect and admire the achievements of the human mind at least as much as its downfalls.
